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This paper considers the policy outcome of a contest between two opposing in-
terest groups: the incumbent fishermen and a group of conservationalists. The 
objective of the fishermen is to maximize profit, and they are (partly) concerned 
over future profitability as well, while the conservationalists have the aim of re-
ducing current fishing effort in order to protect fish resources. The probability 
of a result of overfishing is dependent on the relative benefits the two groups 
receive if their preferred policy wins the contest. This model enables us to pre-
dict how climate change induces changes in the underlying bionomic model and 
affects the probability of conservation. The main result is that the likelihood of 
conservation increases when climate change implies a larger percentage in-
crease in the conservation value to the conservationalists than the percentage 
increase in the commercial value for the fishermen. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper considers the regulation of a renewable resource. The pre-regulation 
situation is characterized by overfishing. In the regulation stage, regulation is 
determined as a political economy game between the incumbent fishermen on 
the one hand and the conservationalists on the other hand. It is assumed that the 
objective of the fishermen is to maximize profit, and they are (partly) concerned 
over future profitability as well, while the conservationalists aim to reduce the 
current fishing effort in order to protect fish resources.  
 
In the political contest model applied in the current paper, only two possible 
outcomes can result, either a situation with some level of overfishing, or a total 
temporary closure of the fishery. In this type of model, the probability that a 
specific outcome is chosen depends on the relative gains the two groups receive 
from winning the contest. Although only two policy options are considered, 
there are reasons why this could be acceptable. These probabilities could be 
interpreted as the expected (ex ante) probabilities that a given outcome will 
result. Another interpretation is that the regulator has a number of regulatory 
instruments available, which broadly result in the two outcomes of continued 
overfishing or closure of the fishing effort. It is well established in the literature 
that the individual fishermen are either in a common pool or an open access 
situation, both giving the individual fishermen incentives to maximize their 
short run profit, which implies that they will not consider the future profitability 
of the industry. It should be noted that many papers find that regulation is not 
effective in achieving sustainable catch levels. According to Pitcher (2001), the 
ecosystem is constantly eroded, partly due to the fact that fishing effort acts as a 
selection mechanism favoring short lived, fast growing fish (Pauly, 1995) and 
partly due to a series of political and economic imperatives that drives the 
system in a downward spiral. (Ludwig et al., 1993).
1 The main lesson from 
                                                            
1   There are four elements to Ludwig’s ratchet: The promise of profit in the fishery attracts politi-
cal and economic power that, in the face of uncertainty about resource abundance, drives the 
decision-making process. Science is unable to measure the abundance of fish accurately enough 
or to predict future states of fish stocks well enough to demonstrate the negative effects of over- 
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these observations is that that there is an inherent incentive structure which 
implies overfishing regardless of regulation, aside from total closure of the 
fishery. 
 
Political contest models have been applied to analyse contests between 
competing interest groups (Nitzan, 1994), coordination efforts by interest 
groups sharing the same objective of influencing the provision of a specific 
public good (Dijkstra, 1998), and the interaction between an interest group and 
a two-tier government where the interest group tries to influence the politicians 
to reject or accept the proposals made by agenda-setting bureaucrats (Epstein 
and Nitzan, 2002). Political contest models are useful in situations where it is 
possible to influence a political decision that has two (or more generally a finite 
and discrete set of) possible outcomes. The specification of the model in the 
current paper resembles that of Epstein and Nitzan (2002), where two interest 
groups compete over the provision of a public good which is beneficial to one 
group and costly to the other group.  
 
The point of departure with respect to the behaviour of the fishermen is an 
assumption that the fishermen are organized in a (partly) effective lobby group 
with the objective to maximize the total intertemporal profit for the group as a 
whole. Why should the fishermen’s organizations’ preferred policy be a high 
catch in the first period rather than the level that maximizes intertemporal 
profit? One obvious reason is that the fishermen’s organization does not have 
sufficient discretion over the individual fishermen. A well established fact in 
the literature is that the individual fishermen are either in a common pool or 
open access situation, both of which give the individual fishermen incentives to 
                                                           
exploitation until it is too late. In the face of scientific uncertainty, investment in the fishery ex-
pands to the point that rents are dissipated and the economic viability of individual fishing units 
becomes marginal. When there is a short-term increase in fish abundance, investment in the 
fishery expands. When there is a short-term decrease in fish abundance, disinvestment is slow 
and the industry appeals to the government for assistance. Assistance is typically given by the 
government, ostensibly as a short-term measure. In reality, the assistance tends to become in-
corporated into the functional economics of the fishery.  
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maximize their short run profit, which again implies that they will not consider 
the future profitability of the industry.
2 
 
However, even though the fishermen’s organization has full discretion over the 
behaviour of the fishermen in the industry, there are several reasons why it 
might also be collectively rational for the whole group of fishermen to overfish 
in the first period. Olson (1965) states that the commonality of the goals of an 
interest group’s members makes the achievement of these goals a public good 
for the group, which thus gives rise to the same incentives to free-ride as exist 
in all public good-prisoners’ dilemma situations.
3  
 
There might, moreover, also be several reasons for strategic overfishing, such 
as entry deterrence and subsidy catching.
4 One obvious method of entry 
deterrence is to propose a regulation that acts as a barrier to entry. This feature 
has been seen repeatedly in environmental issues (see Brandt and Svendsen, 
2004). Johnson and Libecap (1982) report several instances where local fish 
unions have tried to hinder entry. The incentive for fishermen to deter entry by 
making the stock smaller through the strategy of overfishing is recognized in 
several papers. There are, however, countervailing incentives present for the 
fishermen since they must balance foregone profits in the short run against 
                                                            
2   Wilen (2000) nicely describes the development of economic theory into fisheries regulation, 
pointing out that the most promising approach recently has been the introduction of individu-
ally transferable quotas (ITQs) [define this acronym.  Also, you use ITO first, and then ITQ, 
make sure you change them to agree]. Although ITQs can solve many of the problems in fish-
eries with respect to overcapitalization (problems such as insufficient effort per boat and too 
many fishermen) and therefore tend to increase the profitability of the industry, it will not in it-
self solve the problem of overfishing resulting from political pressure to set the number of is-
sued quotas too high. 
3   Two important conclusions can be drawn from this observation: (1) It is easier to form an inter-
est group when the number of potential members is small than when the number is large; and 
(2) Thus, the establishment of an organisation that effectively represents large numbers of indi-
viduals requires that “separate and ‘selective’ incentives” be used to curb free-riding behaviour. 
4   However, even if the fishermen themselves have the incentive to reduce the fleet size, there 
might be strategic incentives on the national level to have a large fleet size. Ruseski (1998) re-
ports several situations where fish stocks have been severely depleted due to competition be-
tween national fleets. This can be done, either by increasing fleet size directly (licensing pol-
icy), or by effort subsidisation. Both policies imply an inflated fleet size and insufficient rent.  
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discounted future increased profit opportunities given less entry. Brandt (2005) 
discusses the conditions for entry deterrence to be an optimal strategy. 
Moreover, the existence of a subsidy structure (or expectations of such a 
scheme) where the marginal subsidy is negatively related to the size of the 
stock, will also be an incentive to increase short run catches. The profitability in 
the fishing industry will suddenly fall dramatically by continuously overfishing 




The second group that has the power to influence the decision of how to 
manage the fish resource is an environmental group with the aim of 
conservation of the resource. More specific, their agenda is to increase the stock 
size of the resource to an “acceptable” level. This could be motivated by 
safeguarding the stock in case of unforeseen (stochastic) temporary shocks that 
could force the stock below its minimum level with long lasting adverse 
consequences.
6 The objective of the conservationalists is to secure the stock of 
the fish by temporarily closing the fishery.
7 Since the consequence of 
temporarily closing is a more profitable fishery in the future, the adoption of 
this policy undermines the incumbent fishermen’s ability to deter entry.  
 
When the conservationists win the contest, the adopted policy is one of 
conserving the resource. The result of the contest depends on the relative gain 
the two interest groups receive from winning the contest. Since climate change 
is likely to affect the two interest groups’ gain differently, it is possible to 
                                                            
5  A nice introduction to the issue of subsidies in fisheries is provided by Schrank (2003). 
6   As an example of the objectives of the conservationalists: The International Council for the Ex-
ploration of the Sea (ICES) has been calling for a complete ban on cod fishing in the North Sea, 
Irish Sea and west of Scotland, in order to prevent cod stocks from going the way of the Cana-
dian cod stocks which collapsed in the early 1990s, See ICES (2005). 
7   Brandt and Svendsen (2006) analyze this in a strategic context: if the regulator is uncertain of 
the true stock, then situations exist where conservationalists prefer overfishing in the short run, 
since with declining stocks (and eventually declining catches) the biologists might find it easier 
to convince the regulator to stop the fisheries. This scheme works best in the presence of subsi-
dies.   
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derive how the probability of conservation changes in different climate change 
regimes.  
 
The third report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 
2001) estimates an increase in the global mean temperature of 1.4 - 5.8 degrees 
from 1990 to 2100, with possible significant regional differences. The 
temperatures are expected to increase more at high latitudes, affecting the future 
profitability of fisheries, since climate change is expected to influence the 
recruitment, size and quality of the fish resource, changes in migration of 
species, or even changes in transportation of larvae.
8 We will specifically focus 
on how climate change influences the relative benefit to the two competing 
interest groups through its effect on biological background variables, and 
consequently, how the probability of conservation is linked to climate change 
induced alterations in the model. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section analyses the behaviour of 
the incumbent fishermen and the conservationalists, while section 3 states the 
political contest model. Part two of the paper analyses how the probability of 
conservation is affected by climate change. In section 4 the effect of expected 
climate changes on the availability of fish in the future is examined and its  
implication on profits for the fishermen (section 4.1) and utility to the 
conservationalists (section 4.2) is analysed. 5. The effect of climate change on 
the probability of conservation is derived in section 5, while section 7 
concludes the paper.  
2.  The behaviour of the fishermen and the 
conservationalists 
In this section a two-period fisheries management model is set up. We assume 
that second period catch levels are exogenously determined, but where in the 
                                                            
8   See e.g. Buck et al, (2004).  
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first period the management outcome and catch level are determined by a 
political contest between the incumbent fishermen and the conservationalists.
9  
Let  1 q  be the first-period catch level decided upon by the political contest, while 
2 q  is the pre-determined second-period catch.  , 1,2 t Pt = , are the exogenously 
determined and constant prices of the fish in periods 1 and 2, respectively. 
Second-period profits are connected to first period catch levels through the 
connection between  1 q  and  2 S , given by  
 
)) , ( 1 1 2 S q g k S
CC ⋅ =  (1) 
 
It is assumed that  0
'
1 > S g  and  0
'
1 < q g , where  t S  is the stock at time t.  0 >
CC k  is a 
parameter that measures how climate change affects the growth of the future 
stock. If climate change is not affecting the stock, then  1 =
CC k , which represents 
the baseline situation. If  1 <
CC k , then the presence of climate change reduces 
second period stock for the same size of current stock and current catch levels.
10 
This could be due to worse conditions for recruitment of fish if the climate 
change is severe. Finally, define the cost function as  )) , ( t t t S q c , measuring the 
cost of providing  t q  units fish given the present stock is  t S  with  0
' >
t q c  and 
0
' <
t S c .
11 Given that second-period catch is exogenously determined, we can 
easily determine second-period industry profit as  ) , ( , 2 2 2 2 2 S q c q P − ⋅ = π [There is 
an extra close parenthesis here and a comma after S2 that I cannot delete since 
they are in the equation, please edit]. Define the highest possible second period 
profit as  0 2
max
2 1 | = = q π π , i.e. second period profits are maximized if no fish are 
caught in period 1 since second-period catch levels are fixed but costs 
monotonically decrease with stock size.  
 
                                                            
9   Other papers also assume a fixed second period stock, e.g.., see Bergland et al. (2001). A com-
ment on this assumption is made in the conclusion. 
10   If  1 >
CC k , then the presence of climate change increases second period stock, for the same size 
of current stock and current catch levels. 
11  
' 0
t q c >  and 
' 0
t S c <  denote the derivatives of the cost function with respect to the catch and the 
stock, respectively.  
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A well established fact in the literature is that the individual fishermen have 
incentive to maximize their short run profit and not to consider the future 
profitability of the industry. On the other hand, such behaviour is not 
collectively rational for the group of fishermen as a whole, unless high current 
catches imply higher profit of rent in the future (see below). Fishermen are, 
however, often part of an organization that promotes the policies which serve 
the fishermen’s interests, which face the underlying incentives problem 
between what is best for the group and best for the individual. To capture this 
incentive problem, we assume that the fishermen’s organization has some (but 
not full) discretion over the individual fishermen, such that the fishermen’s 
organization’s objective in the first period is a catch level 
F q1  that only partly 
maximizes intertemporal profit,  } max{ arg 2 1 1 π π ⋅ + = d q
F  with  1 0 < < d , where the 
parameter d measures the level of discretion of the fishermen’s organization 
over the member fishermen).
12 We assume for simplicity that d is invariant with 
respect to 
CC k . Note that in this writing, the problem resembles the 
maximization of intertemporal profits in the presence of a discount rate. 
However, if discounting is introduced, this will push catches even closer to the 
open access catch level.  
 
The parameter d measures the level of weight the fishermen’s organization 
assigns to future profitability. If d approaches 0, then we are in a situation 
where the fishermen act fully myopic. In this case, the resulting outcome in the 
first period will be independent of how later periods evolve. We denote this 
level by:  } max{ arg 1 1 π =
MY q . The other extreme is a situation with a benevolent 
regulator acting in the long run interest of the incumbent fishermen and with 
full discretion over the actions of the fishermen, or a sole owner (monopolist) 
operating in the industry, who would fully take into account how current 
catches affect future profitability. In this case, the resulting preferred first-
period catch level will be given by  } max{ arg 2 1
*
1 π π + = q . In total,  ) , ( 1
*
1 1
OA F q q q ∈ . 
                                                            
12   Note that the size of d is affected by factors such as the probability of entry, the presence of 
subsidies and the number of incumbent fishermen.   
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Note that for  1 < d , the catch level is too high compared to a social optimum, 
denoting the strategy of the fishermen for overfishing.  
 
It is importantly for the analysis in this paper how 
F q1  varies with 
CC k , since this 
describes how climate change influences the preferred position of the 
fishermen. In order to derive this relationship, it is necessary to solve the 
following maximization program given by:  
 
)) , ( ( ) , ( max 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 S q c q P d S q c q P d − ⋅ + − ⋅ = ⋅ + π π  subject to (1). 
 
The first order conditions are 
' ' '
1 2 1 q S
CC
q g c K d c P ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + = . As long as  0 > d , 
*
1 1 q q
MY >  
such that catches are reduced in the first period compared to the myopic 
situation. When 
CC k  is reduced, this effect is weakened. This is summarized in 
lemma 1:  
 







q  for  0 > d . 
 
The result is in a sense trivial, since the reason why catches are larger [do you 
mean smaller?] than under the myopic situation is the expected second period 
gains from fishing less in the first period. When the expected gains are reduced, 
the incentive to conserve the resource in the first period is reduced as well.  
 
The conservationalists’ utility is derived from the stock size at the end of a 
period,  () tt t uS q − . It is assumed that () 0
t tS u >  and () 0
t tq u < .
13 The implication is 
that lower catches in the first period increase utility for the conservationalists in 
both periods. The intertemporal utility for the conservationalists 
reads: 11 1 12 2 () ( ) uu Sq u S q =− +− . Given (1), it is easy to see that the optimal choice 
of the conservationalists is  0 1 = q .
14 
 
                                                            
13   ( )
t tS u denotes the derivative of the utility function with respect to the stock.  
14   E.g. ICES (2005) determines lowest safe levels.  
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In conclusion, the two contestants’ preferred strategies are 
F q1  for the fishermen 
and  0 1 = q  for the conservationalists. This can be interpreted as an ex ante 
probability to be defined below of a situation with either overfishing or 
conservation.  
3.  The political contest model 
Consider the following timing of events: currently, the fishery is characterized 
by overfishing. The fishermen are organized in an interest group that only 
partially overcomes the “internal” free riding problem (see Olson, 1965). The 
objective of the organization is to pursue a policy that is in line with the 
preferences of the fishermen.  
 
However, an environmental group appears with the aim of conserving the 
resource. More specifically, its agenda is to increase the stock size of the 
resource to an “acceptable” level.
15 If this policy is applied, it will be very 
costly for the fishermen in the short run, though they will be better off in the 
second period. Assume that there are only two policy options, and no 
possibilities for compromise between them. The two policy options are the 
incumbent fishermen’s preferred action and the conservationalists’ optimal 
conservation policy. The table presents the utilities for each group in the two 
policy situations:  
 
Table 1.  The benefits in the two possible outcomes of the contest 
Group  Overfishing policy   Conservation policy 
Fishermen   ) ( 1
F q π   ) 0 ( π  
Conservationalists  1 ()
F uq   (0) u  
                                                            
15   This could be motivated by safeguarding the stock in case of unforeseen (stochastic) temporary 
shocks that could force the stock below its minimum level with long lasting adverse conse-
quences. The way this could be accomplished is by a temporary reduction in the total allowable 
catches (TAC) below the present catch level until the new stock is achieved and then to in-
crease the TAC again, as shown in Munro, 1998.  
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From the discussion in section 2 it follows that  ) ( 1
F q π > ) 0 ( π  and  (0) u > 1 ()
F uq . 
With a probability 
F p  the fishermen’s preferred policy is selected, while with 
probability 
C p  = 1-
F p  the preferred policy of the conservation group is 
selected. In this type of political contest model, it is generally assumed that the 
contenders can affect the probabilities by their contribution level. The existence 
of a contest success function (CSF) is also assumed that specifies the 
probability of approval of the proposed policy corresponding to the rent-seeking 
effort of the interest groups (See Epstein and Nitzan, 2002). Let 
F x  and 
C x  be 
the contribution of the fishermen’s group and the conservationalists, 
respectively. A commonly used CSF is the constant returns to scale non-
discriminating rule:  /( )
FF F C p xxx =+  and  /( )
CC FC p xxx =+ . Let  ) 0 ( ) ( 1 π π π − = Δ
F q  
and [in the previous equation, you have q
F
1 instead of q1
F, edit if desired] 
1 (0) ( )
F uu u q Δ= −  be the groups’ benefits from winning the contest.
16 
 




















































From the equilibrium strategies it is straightforward to determine how changes 
in the relative gains to the contenders of winning the contest influence the 





















∂Δ Δ + Δ
. 
 
The probability of conservation is increasing with the relative gain of the 
conservationalists and decreasing with the relative gain of the fishermen. 
(When both  π Δ  and  u Δ  increase with the same percentage, then the probability 
of conservation remains unchanged).  
                                                            
16   We do not have a common reference situation, by which winning can be compared.   
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4.  The probability of conservation in the presence of 
climate change 
The focus will now be on the effect of climate change on the success of 
conservation or the failure to eliminate overfishing. The natural size of the fish 
stock (net of fishing effort) is dependent on factors such as the average water 
temperature, either directly or through climate related changes in salinity, 
average wind and the presence of other species. Changes in these variables can 
have an effect on the recruitment, size and quality of the fish resource, 
migration of species or even transportation of larvae. There are several 
mechanisms through which climate related changes will affect future fish 
resources. For example, the cod in the North Atlantic is suspected to move to 
the north, yielding more harvesting possibilities in the North Atlantic and less 
for the North Sea.
17  
4.1.  The implication of lower future stocks on profits 
Given the discussion in the previous section, the expected climate changes have 
the potential to affect the fisheries in several ways. In order to give any 
predictions about likely future impacts of climate on fisheries, the specific local 
or regional conditions have to be known. In order to develop some general 
results, assume a situation where climate change reduces 
CC k  below 1. Given 
lemma 1, for a reduction in 
CC k , the preferred catch level in the first period for 
the fishermen increases. Denote this new catch level  )} ( max{ arg 1
CC CC k q π = , such 
that  11
CC F qq > .
18 On the other hand, since the conservationalists’ preferred first-
period is a temporary closure of the fish-activity, their preferred level is not 
affected by changes in the growth function of the stock. 
 
What matters here is how much the climate change affects the gain from 




t q q π π π − = Δ  
                                                            
17   See e.g. Dickson and Brander (1993) and Blindheim et al. (2000). 
18   The notation here is chosen to highlight that it is the effect coming from a reduction in 
CC k .   
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[again, in the previous equation, you have q
F
1 instead of q1
F, edit if desired] and 
11 () () ( 0 )
CC CC
tt t qq πππ Δ=−  are the net gains from winning in period t for the 
fishermen in the baseline situation and the climate change situation, 
respectively. Finally,  11 () ( )
CC CC F
tt t qq ππ π Δ= Δ − Δ  expresses the change in net gain 
for the fishermen in period t when moving from a baseline situation to the 
climate change regime in the first period. Formally, the general expression for 
the fishermen is: 
 
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 () ( ) [ () ( 0 ) ] [ ( ) ( 0 ) ] () ( )
CC CC F CC F CC F qq q q q q ππ π π π π ππ π Δ= Δ − Δ = − − − = −  (2a) 
2 21 21 22 1 22 221 22 ( ) ( ) [ ( ( )) ( (0))] [ ( ( )) ( (0))]
CC CC F CC CC CC F qq S q S S q S ππ π π π π π Δ= Δ − Δ = − − −  (2b) 
 
(2a) expresses the change in net gain when moving from a baseline situation to 
the climate change regime in the first period. In the first period, the gain from 
winning the contest given climate change implies a larger profit for the 
fishermen because they fish more, while losing the contest implies the same 
profit in either situation. For the first period, it is obvious that  0 1 > Δ
CC π . 
 
For the second period, rewrite (2b): 
22 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 [( ( ) ) (() ) ] [( ( 0 ) ) (( 0 ) ) ]
CC CC CC F CC Sq S q S S ππ π π π Δ= − − − . The first part measures the 
change in profit from winning the contest under climate change compared to 
baseline in the second period. It must be the case that 
22 1 221 {( ( ) ) (() ) }
CC CC F sign S q S q ππ −  =  21 2 1 { ( )) ( ))}
CC CC F sign S q S q − , which definitely is 
negative, since the second-period stock is lower for the same first-period catch 
level in the climate change regime, and catches in the first period are also 
larger, such that  22 1 221 ( ( )) ( ( )) 0
CC CC F Sq S q ππ −< . The second part measures the change 
in profit from losing the contest under climate change compared to baseline, 
and it follows that  0 )) 0 ( ( )) 0 ( ( 2 2 2 2 < − S S
CC π π , since the first-period catch is equal, 
while the stock is smaller under climate change. In total, we have that:  0 2 <
> Δ
CC π .  
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4.2.  The implication of climate change on the conservationalists’ utility 
How does climate change affect the utility of the conservationalists? First of all, 
the conservationalists’ preferred catch level in the first period remains 
unchanged at a zero catch level. The effect of the climate change on the 
conservationalists’ utility appears through the changed action of the fishermen 
in the first period, the derived effect of this in the second period and the reduced 
growth of the stock given climate change.  
 
The general expression for the conservationalists reads:  
 
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 () ( ) [ ( 0 )() ] [ ( 0 )( ) ] ( )()
CC CC F CC F F CC uu qu q u u qu u q u q u q Δ= Δ − Δ = − − − = −  (2c) 
2 21 21 22 22 1 22 221 ( ) ( ) [ ( (0)) ( ( ))] [ ( (0)) ( ( ))]
CC CC F CC CC CC F u uq q uS uS q uS uSq π Δ= Δ − Δ = − − −  (2d) 
 
(2c) measures the change in the net gain for the conservationalists from winning 
the contest when comparing the baseline situation with a climate change 
regime. Since () 0
t tq u < , and  11
CC F qq > , it follows that  11 1 1 1 () ( )0
CC F CC uu qu q Δ =− > . That 
is, the net gain for the conservationalists is increased, since the utility from 
winning remains unchanged, while the utility from losing is reduced.   
 
For period 2, rewrite (2d):  22 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 [( ( 0 ) ) (( 0 ) ) ][( ( ) ) (( ) ) ]
CC CC CC CC F u uS uS uS q uSq Δ= − − − . 
The first bracket measures the change in the utility in the second period from 
winning the contest. This is clearly negative, since the stock is lower in the 
climate change regime, that is  0 )) 0 ( ( )) 0 ( ( 2 2 2 2 < − S u S u
CC . The second bracket 
measures the change in the utility from losing the contest. This is also clearly 
negative, since the conservationalists’ utility in the second period is smaller 
when losing the contest since catch levels in first period are larger and the 
reproduction is smaller, that is,  22 1 221 ( ( )) ( ( )) 0
CC CC F uS q uSq − < . In total,  0 2 >
< Δ
CC u . Table 
2 summarizes the effects.  
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Table 2.  Summarizing the effects of climate change 
0 1 > Δ
CC u   Catches are higher in period 1 under climate change, while the 
baseline is identical; therefore the net gain in utility from winning is 
increased for the conservationalists.  
0 2 >
< Δ
CC u    The utility from losing is reduced, but the utility from winning is 
also reduced,  0 2 > Δ
CC u  if  22 1 221 22 22 [( ( ) ) (( ) ) ][( ( 0 ) ) (( 0 ) ) ]
CC CC F CC uS q uSq uS uS −>−
0 1 > Δ
CC π   Fishermen do not care as much about the second period under 
climate change, and net profit from winning the contest increases in 
the first period.  
0 2 <
> Δ
CC π   The profit from losing is reduced, while the profit from winning is 
also reduced,  0 2 > Δ
CC π  if 22 1 221 22 22 [ ( ( )) ( ( ))] [ ( (0)) ( (0))]
CC CC F CC Sq S q S S ππ π π −> −
 
Note that the conservationalists often will gain more from winning the contest 
in the presence of climate change compared to no climate change (that is, when 
0 2 1 > Δ + Δ
CC CC u u ). The reason is that the fishermen act more aggressively in the 
first period, when climate change reduces the future profitability of the 
fisheries. This implies that given climate change, the resource will be 
deteriorated more in the first period and the value of protecting the resource 
increases. This is also true when all else is equal for the second period, but here 
there is also the direct effect of climate change, which reduces the stock in the 
second period. Only if this latter effect dominates the two other effects will the 
value from winning will be smaller for the conservationalists under climate 
change. The effect works in the same way for the fishermen, who often gain 
more from winning the contest in the presence of climate change (when 
0 2 1 > Δ + Δ
CC CC π π ).  
5.  The effect of climate change on the probability of 
conservation 
Common sense might suggest that if future stock sizes are likely to be 
depressed due to climate change, the pressure from the conservationalists to  
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conserve the resource will increase with the effect that the probability of 
conservation is increased. However, when the policy outcome is determined by 
a contest between two opposing interested lobby groups, the outcome of an 
expected climate change regime is more complex. The analysis in the previous 
section reveals that  0
CC π >  and  0
CC u Δ >  are the most likely situations. This 
means that both interest groups receive a larger net gain from winning the 
contest, so the probability of conservation is, from the outset, ambiguous. 
Therefore, it is necessary to deal with this rigorously. 
 






















































That is, the likelihood of conservation increases when climate change increases 
the value of conservation (measured by changes in utility to the 
conservationalists) more in percentage than the commercial value of the 
resource (measured as changes in profit to the fishermen), and vise versa; if the 
value to the fishermen increases more in percentage than the value to the 
conservationalists, then the probability of conservation decreases.
20 
 
Two special cases serve as an explanation of this result: First, in the situation 
where  0
CC π =  and  0










                                                            
19   This follows from totally differentiating the expression for the probability of conservation. 
20   This result can also be expressed in reverse; if the likelihood of conserving the resource in-
creases, then the conservation value (utility to the conservationalists) is reduced less than the 
commercial value of the resource (profit to the fishermen).  
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only the conservationalists receive more benefit from winning the contest, 
which implies that they are willing to invest more in the political process to win 
the contest. Given that the fishermen do not increase their contribution, the 
likelihood that the conservationalists win the contest increases.  
 
On the other hand, if  0
CC π > , while  0









. Here, only the 
fishermen receive more benefit from winning the contest, which implies that 
they are willing to invest more in the political process to win the contest. Given 
that the conservationalists do not increase their contribution, the likelihood that 
the fishermen win the contest increases.  
 
It follows from the proposition that the group that receives the highest 
percentage increase in benefit from winning the contest also invests the most, 
and consequently, has a larger likelihood of winning the contest.  
6.  Conclusion 
Mounting evidence suggest that man-made emissions of greenhouse gasses 
cause climate change and that we are at the beginning of an unstoppable trend 
of increasing temperatures. This implies several climate change related changes 
in the background variables relevant for the relative abundance of the fish 
resource. In light of this, fisheries management schemes need to be adjusted in 
order to cope with future climate change induced changes in the variables 
affecting fisheries. The results underpin some of the difficulties future designers 
of fisheries regulation are likely to face.  
 
By modelling the determination of fisheries management as a contest between 
interest groups with opposing objectives, it is possible to endogenously 
determine the probability of conservation as determined by the interest groups’ 
relative gain of winning the contest. Climate change is expected to affect the 
fisheries in several ways, depending on what type of fishery is the issue, both  
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with respect to type of fish and the geographical location of the fish resource. 
As a consequence, climate change will have the possibility of influencing the 
relative gain from winning the contest in different ways. This paper provides a 
characterization of how the probability of conservation is related to climate 
change related changes in the biological “background” variables. The results 
suggest that areas with increasing value from conservation will be more likely 
to be conserved, while areas with highest increase in commercial value will be 
likely to experience higher fishing pressure.  
 
There are some assumptions in this paper that deserve further consideration, 
particularly the fact that second period regulation is treated exogenously. This is 
critical, since it implies that second period TAC are independent of first period 
behaviour, or rather that the players have fixed expectations about the second 
period. A more likely effect could be that in the case of higher fishing pressure 
in period 1, the regulator would be more inclined to demand higher regulation 
in the future. This would imply another crowding out effect in the second 
period from an increase in the catch level in the first period. Not only will the 
stock be lower, but catches will also be smaller. This effect will, however, not 
qualitatively change the result. One could also consider each period as a new 
contest, which seems to be how real life policy works. However, this 
considerably complicates the analysis, most likely without adding any 
significant new insights.  
 
Finally, further research is clearly needed into the subject of the political 
economy of the regulation of renewable resources. Within the framework of the 
presented analysis, an interesting extension would be to consider what happens 
if the carrying capacity of the resource is also affected as well. For example, a 
situation where the climate change reduces the resilience of the resource, 
implying a larger probability of a possibly irreversible collapse of the resource 
for the same catch levels in the first period would influence the behaviour of 
both groups. If overfishing implies a higher probability of collapse of the 
resource given climate change, and fishermen are to some extent concerned 
about the future, climate change is likely to reduce the preferred fishing effort  
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of the fishermen in the first period, reducing the likelihood of overfishing. 
However, in the framework of this paper, we also have to consider the 
conservationalists. If the likelihood of a collapse of the resource increases, the 
costs of losing for the conservationalists will be very high.   
25
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